Part 14 of 17
Foreign Policy of Montenegro
European integration, NATO and international relations
Montenegro is one of the youngest European states, yet since restoring independence in 2006 it has demonstrated notable diplomatic activity. The country's strategy rests on three interconnected pillars:
- •Full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures
- •Maintaining regional stability in the Western Balkans
- •Diversifying external economic ties for sustainable growth
The Young State's Path: Establishing Diplomacy after 2006
The referendum of 21 May 2006, in which 55.5%of citizens voted for separation from Serbia, became the starting point of a new foreign policy era. To date, 182 states have recognised Montenegro's sovereignty; the country joined the OSCE on 21 June 2006, the UN on 28 June 2006 and the IMF on 18 January 2007; the first bilateral friendship and mutual assistance agreements were signed.
Fact: to establish its basic embassy network, Montenegro made use of an agreement with Serbia on consular protection — a rare example of pragmatic post-split cooperation. The diplomats' main task was to "embed" the young state within the existing order, ensuring its security and external economic support. Hence the choice of the EU and NATO course as both an "umbrella" and a "reform locomotive" simultaneously.
European Integration: Route, Figures and Prospects
Montenegro was the first Western Balkan candidate to move to "screening under the new methodology" focused on the rule of law. In June 2024 it received a positive IBAR report on chapters 23 and 24, which opened the way to closing negotiating chapters at an accelerating pace.
- •Corruption and politicisation of the courts. The European Commission annually emphasises the need to depoliticise the Supreme Judicial Council.
- •Historical disputes. The Jasenovac Resolution (2024) strained relations with Croatia, which in an extreme case could temporarily block negotiating chapters 23/24.
- •Limited administrative capacity of the state apparatus for legislative harmonisation at the final stage of negotiations.
If the current momentum is maintained and domestic political consensus holds, 2028 remains a plausible accession date, as confirmed by European Commission assessments and the statements of President Jakov Milatović at the GLOBSEC-2025 forum.
NATO: Security, Reforms and Public Division
Montenegro joined the Partnership for Peace programme on 14 December 2006, having been invited at the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006. Then came the Membership Action Plan (2009), an invitation (2015) and official membership on 5 June 2017.
- •Article 5 of the Washington Treaty provides collective defence
- •Army standardisation and modernisation through NATO cooperation programmes
- •Greater investor confidence thanks to collective security guarantees
- •In 2016, the opposition brought up to 20,000 protesters onto the streets demanding a referendum
- •Accession caused a cooling in relations with Moscow, traditionally viewed as the "Orthodox patron"
Russia: From Romance to Confrontation
From 2006 to 2013, Montenegro was called the "Russian Riviera": Russians were among the largest groups of foreign property owners on the coast, tourist arrivals from Russia exceeded 300,000 per season, and Russian capital was actively invested in the economy.
The turning point was 2014 and EU sanctions. Montenegro synchronised its restrictive measures regime with Brussels, and in 2016 added a further 149 individuals to the list. Key events:
Figure: according to estimates cited by the Russian ambassador, the cumulative losses from severed economic ties with Russia amount to approx. €4 billion for 2014–2024, but these have been partially offset by visitors from other markets. Today diplomatic relations are at a minimum.
The Balkans: Between Cooperation and Historical Memory
Montenegro is strengthening ties within CEFTA and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (it has not joined the "Open Balkan" initiative, whose members are only Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia — Montenegro attended some of its summits solely as an observer), advancing projects:
International Organisations: A Small Country's Voice
| Organisation | Year of Accession | Benefits |
|---|---|---|
| UN | 2006 | Access to development funds, peacekeeping operations |
| Council of Europe | 2007 | Human rights monitoring, Venice Commission |
| Interpol | 2006 | Exchange of criminal data |
| WTO | 2012 | Full member since 29 April 2012; access to the multilateral trading system |
The UN platform allows Montenegro to actively lobby the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) agenda, while membership in the WHO Small States Initiative provides grants for healthcare digitalisation.
EU Integration Status — 2026
In June 2024 Montenegro received a positive IBAR report on chapters 23 and 24, opening the way to closing negotiating chapters. As of August 2026, 18 of 33 chapters have been provisionally closed: 12 as of December 2025 (including five at the conference on 16 December 2025), 14 by March 2026, chapters 2 and 28 closed at the intergovernmental conference on 15 June 2026, and chapters 8 (Competition Policy) and 29 (Customs Union) on 14 July 2026. The government's goal is to close all chapters by the end of 2026 and join the EU in 2028; the European Commission calls Montenegro the frontrunner of enlargement.
The most difficult chapters are 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security). Part of the commitments is alignment of visa policy with the EU: under a government decree of 23 July 2026, visas for citizens of Russia (as well as Belarus, China, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia) will be introduced from 1 November 2026; visa-free entry for up to 30 days remains available until 31 October 2026. Detailed visa application rules had not yet been published as of August 2026.
Current Challenges of 2025
Montenegro is taking the "short road" to the European family, seeking to monetise its geographical position and image as a "boutique destination" on the Adriatic. But unfinished judicial reforms, unresolved historical disputes in the Balkans, and a cooling in relations with its former principal tourist market — Russia — are making this path less straightforward. The success of foreign policy up to 2030 will depend on whether Podgorica can maintain the political balance between "West and traditional partners", build institutional resilience and align itself with the EU's green agenda.
Information current as of August 2026. This material is for general information purposes.